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Abstract
In this paper, we explore what network economics is all about,
focusing on the interesting topics brought about by the Internet. Our
intent is make this a brief survey, useful as an outline for a course
on this topic, with an extended list of references. We try to make it
as intuitive and readable as possible. We also deliberately try to be
critical at times, and hope our interpretation of the topic will lead to
interests for further discussions by those doing research in the same
field.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
What is network economics? It is a question worth pondering.
As a research topic, needless to say, it is an inter-disciplinary area be-
tween economics and networks. By networks, we are referring mostly to the
Internet, a network that permeates our society and daily life. The scope,
however, can be much broader1, to include other forms of network such
as transportation networks and social networks. We deliberately limit our
scope so that we can focus our reflection on what network economic studies
particularly have benefited the engineering and management of the Internet,
and how the Internet may have changed the economic thinking or introduced
new concepts. We also deliberately try to be somewhat critical as times,
pointing out certain self indulgence or re-invention of the wheel.
The Internet is the biggest man-made object by many measures. Be-
ginning as a computer network, it has rapidly become a global information
1Probably a more satisfactory perspecptive to economists.
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infrastructure, a platform for exchange of information among people and ma-
chines all over the world. Commercialization in mid-1990s led not only to
rapid expansion of the Internet as a computer network, it has led to radical
change of what it is. [1] pointed out that what the new Internet connects
are autonomous self-interested agents. Ownership, operation, and use by
many self-interested, independent parties give the Internet the characteris-
tics of an economy as well as those of a computer [1]. Economic concepts of
demand and supply, markets and mechanisms, competition and incentives,
etc. have become new concepts for the Internet engineer in dealing with
network traffic, resources, protocols, algorithms, and continual appearance
of novel applications that bring along changes in traffic and user behaviour.
Our exploration of this topic is prompted by concrete motivations. At
our department, we will start offering a graduate level course with the title
Network Economics. What would be suitable content for such a course, and
how should we structure the syllabus to make it more interesting? Another
question that came up recently is whether there should be a journal for this
research topic, considering there is a steady stream of papers categorized to
be network economics without a publication venue of its own. While we do
not try to explicitly answer these questions, we keep these questions in mind
in our discussions.
A necessary disclaimer is that our exploration is unavoidably biased and
non-comprehensive. Both the authors are engineers with only limited ex-
posure to economics. Passing judgement over previous works on a research
topic, though important in advancing the field, is subjective. While we read
and edit2 many papers in this topic area, it is beyond our intention to do a
comprehensive survey, but categorize and highlight only those studies that
impress on us.
1.2 Summary of the content of this paper
Our approach is to focus on the network economic questions, starting from
the simpler and more well formulated ones first. The methodologies, such
as optimization, game theory and mechanism design, are introduced as they
are called for.
We start with the study of network resource allocation policies. We
discuss why the seemingly pure engineering issues become economic because
of the need to use decentralized mechanisms and the need to consider fairness
2One of the authors, in his role as an editor for IEEE/ACM Transactions on Network-
ing, helps process papers on network economics on regular basis.
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and efficiency. Examples of network mechanisms include congestion control
and routing.
As the network becomes large, as is the case of the Internet, the way
the network is connected and formed is not controlled by any single entity,
but by autonomous entities that own and manage part of the network. We
call them Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and the forces that lead the
ISPs to peer and form the network are definitely to a great extent economic.
Additionally, we examine other examples of network formation studies in
Peer-to-peer networks and wireless networks.
Next we discuss network effect. It is the benefit of a connected commu-
nity in which any additional user generates benefit for all without cost. The
Internet can be considered a platform with multiple types of stakeholders.
Such an abstraction is useful for understanding how technology evolves and
gets adopted, and the need for government regulation. For example, net
neutrality, a hotly debated issue in the networking research community as it
affects network architecture and design, is a complicated issue about maxi-
mizing network effect and how to balance its benefits among stakeholders.
Finally, we wrap up by briefly mentioning some other network economic
topics that we have not included, making some observations about this field,
and discussing promising future directions.
2 Network Resource Allocation
Someone wrote in Wikipedia: Economics is the social science that analyzes
the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. A large
number of studies in the design, engineering, and management of networks
(in particular the Internet) are considered from this perspective.
2.1 Policies and mechanisms of traffic control
Perhaps the most salient example is the study of congestion control. On the
surface, it can be treated as a pure engineering problem. It can be motivated
by examining the detrimental effect congestion has on throughput, and the
bandwidth waste and delay in repairing packet losses. Various solutions can
be considered in terms of their ability to maintain throughput, and minimize
retransmission and delay.
But before long, it was realized that economic issues are at the heart
of the congestion control problem. A network provides service to many
at the same time, and congestion is caused by excessive demand by many.
Who is responsible to alleviate it and receive reduced service? Chiu/Jain
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studied the notion of fairness in network and computer system resource
allocation [2], and decentralized algorithms to do congestion control and
achieve fair resource allocation [3]. These are examples of some early works
on network resource allocation that exhibit economic thinking. Another
important mechanism for congestion control is traffic routing, which will
be discussed briefly later. If we look into the economics literature, Varian
wrote about fairness in the 70s [4], and studied the network congestion
control problem via pricing in the early 90s [5].
By late 90s, Kelly et al unified and generalized the previous work on
network congestion control mathematically, as a decentralized mechanism
to solve a utility maximization problem [6]. This formulation allows the
network feedback be naturally interpreted as either a congestion signal, or a
shadow price; the notion of fairness be tied to the utility of the users/flows
using the network [7]; and the congestion control algorithm [3] to be un-
derstood as an algorithm to solve an optimization problem. Amazingly, a
network of users following the same (congestion control) mechanism, can
be viewed as a smart and civilized community who maximizes their collec-
tive social welfare by maximizing their own utility reacting to given market
prices3, an aesthetically pleasing conclusion.
It is also interesting to point out the relationship of network resource
allocation to the more general problem of combinatorial auctions (CA) [8],
studied in economics and theoretical computer science. The CA problem
tries to allocate different combination of bundles of goods to users via auc-
tion, and the users are modeled to have different utility for different bundles,
making the problem quite complicated in general. In this sense, the network
resource allocation problem is a special case of CA.
2.2 Price of anarchy
Since the congestion control mechanisms are decentralized, another valid
and interesting economic question is whether selfish behavior by users will
render these mechanism ineffective? This question has been studied by
economists and mathematicians before. There are two well-known works
that vividly discuss this issue. In considering the sustainability of economic
(or ecological) growth in the presence of selfish behavior, G Hardin wrote
the famous essay on the Tradegy of the Commons [9]. The Braess’s Paradox
[10] is even more to-the-point. By using a concrete example, the paradox il-
lustrates that selfish behavior make users not able to benefit from additional
3Note, users do not have to be price-takers, but try to out-smart others, which usually
lead to less social welfare. This will be discussed in the next subsection.
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network resources.
To characterize the spread between the suboptimal resource allocation
due to selfish behavior and the optimal social welfare, Papadimitriou coined
a term - price of anarchy [11]. For this problem, Roughgarden et al derived
some fundamental results for routing [12], providing the complete solution
for Braess’ paradox; Johari et al studied the congestion control game and
derived the price of anarchy in that case [13].
It is worth pointing out that the study of selfish behavior, though based
on a game-theoretic analysis of an operating equilibrium, treats the users as
a homogeneous population. Hence, the specific motives of users are ignored,
and the scenario is simplistic compared to the game-theoretic analysis of
stakeholders in networks in the next section. Nonetheless, the price of anar-
chy results are useful as a general guide to the design of network mechanisms,
to the extent the model of the selfish motives and behaviors are plausible.
2.3 QoS and network pricing
There is a huge literature on the study of network Quality of Service (QoS).
QoS is also about resource allocation policies in networks, about favoring,
or providing guarantees to certain classes traffic. Since these policies and
mechanisms are rarely deployed in the Internet, it would be speculative to
discuss the network economics issues thereof4.
Network pricing is a related topic amassing research effort more recently.
For the sake of economic equilibrium, traditional price theory mandates pric-
ing that increases with quantity demanded of the product in question. That
would mean usage-based pricing in network services, even congestion-based
pricing. In the presence of significant positive network effects, however,
perhaps a more important consideration is the size of the network, as that
directly determines the value of the network to users. So there is incentive
for service providers to charge a flat-rate price. This was realized by AT&T
long time ago for telephone networks, see [14] for an excellent account of the
history of pricing in communications systems. This is indeed what is prac-
ticed in most parts of the Internet, and other telecommunication services.
We will return to the importance of network size (also known as network
effect) for network economics in a later section.
Furthermore, we want to point out an important distinction between two
notions of network pricing, namely pricing for cost recovery, and pricing for
profit. Broadly speaking, resource pricing for cost recovery is an integral
4Rather, the lack of deployment makes a good economic question for study.
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part of network design, and therefore engineering, the breakeven charge
plan necessary to settle the cost account of an engineering design for its
implementation and operation. Technical assumptions about network traffic
and utilization are made based on design requirements. In contrast, product
pricing for profit is business concern beyond breakeven, for which business
assumptions such as market size and demand elasticities are made based
on market research instead. While traffic models and market models may
look similar in analytical forms, they are categorically distinct and should
be constructed and validated where they belong. We opine that, without
proper market research, theoretical work tinkling with product pricing for
profit is a questionable feat.
2.4 Paris metro pricing
There is, however, a neat idea with a nice tie to some economic theories
worth a description here. The scheme is known as Paris Metro Pricing,
proposed by Andrew Odlyzko, for use in a congested network to provide a
differentiated service [15]. The idea came from a practical system, as the
name suggests, Paris Metro5. It works like this. Each car of the metro is
either designated as First Class or Second Class. If you enter the first class,
you pay an additional charge to the normal fare (for Second Class). The
beauty is that the mechanism self-adapts with users’ reaction to congestion
and the additional charge. When the congestion level of First Class reached
a sufficiently high level (though still better off than that of the Second Class),
some people would start moving to the Second Class cars for a better deal,
and vice versa. For reasonable assumptions of continuity of users’ tolerance
to congestion and additional charges, it is intuitive to see that the system
converges to an equilibrium state.
The key economic question is whether Paris Metro Pricing achieves
higher social welfare, and profits for the operator of the metro (or Inter-
net). Apparently, there were contradicting answers to this question in the
literature for several years. In turns out that indeed you can reach both
conclusions depending on how you model users’ reaction to congestion. The
situation is analogous to two roommates sharing a small apartment which
can be either arranged as a studio (a single large room) or partitioned into
two smaller rooms. You ask different people whether they prefer the for-
mer or the latter, and you will get different answers. One type of people is
5Presumably at one point in time. It is not clear if Paris Metro still implements this
form of service, but it is still in operation in other parts of the world, for example in Hong
Kong’s train system.
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referred to as partition-preferring whereas the other type is referred to as
multiplexing-preferring. In a recent paper [16], we used this classification of
users to develop sufficient conditions for Paris Metro Pricing to be viable,
i.e. able to gain more social welfare, and/or provider profit. The paper
contains additional results to unify previous works on Paris Metro Pricing.
This study of Paris Metro Pricing also makes ties to the classic work
by Hotelling [17] when he studied product differentiation (primarily among
competitors, which can also be applied to a single provider). Hotelling
models a range of users with different preferences, by using the example of
a beach with two ice-cream stands and a distribution of how beach-goers
are spread out on the beach. He is able to derive the popularity of each ice-
cream stand for different locations of placing them, and reach the conclusion
that two competing ice-cream stands would put themselves as close to each
other as possible. This Hotelling model of diverse users can also be applied
to derive the social welfare, and evaluate the best resource allocation for a
single provider system. Indeed, it is useful for a variety of network economic
analysis. This is the reason we make a special point of introducing it here.
3 Economics of network formation
While the last section concerns resources allocation in a network, the ques-
tion considered here is how (large) networks are formed and maintained in
the first place.
3.1 Internetworking - transit and peering
By internetworking, we mean the formation of a network of networks. The
Internet is a network formed when a hierarchy of backbone and access
providers interconnect with each other. Any such network provider faces
two basic questions: (1) whether connection is desirable; (2) if connection is
desirable, which other providers he should connect with. The first question
seems a no-brainer for a profit-seeking network provider serving customers
who desire connectivity, but a real question nevertheless. Conceivably, if his
customers desire connectivity among themselves only, connection with the
outside world is not necessary. Otherwise, it spells the fundamental condi-
tion of an Internet network provider. (Even when customers desire Internet
connection but obtain it elsewhere by multihoming, the provider may do
without interconnection. However, such a provider would, by definition, not
be an Internet network provider.)
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The second basic question is more involved, with both engineering and
economics considerations. Transit and peering are two different categories
of interconnection. Except for backbone providers in the topmost tier, a
network provider needs to procure transit service from another provider, of-
ten one in its immediate upper tier. He may also peer with other providers,
often in the same tier so as to save transit cost and improve service quality at
the same time. However, providers are often competitors also and handing
customer traffic over to one another is not without hesitation. Service level
agreement (SLA) for peering is problematic. Settlement is a more tangible
sub-problem here: traffic demand and requirements in the two directions of
a peering connection differ in general and how the imbalance should be ac-
counted for properly is still an unsettled issue. As a result, two-way peering
tends to be restricted to providers of similar scale, with simple or no settle-
ment arrangement for traffic imbalance. In comparison, multi-way peering
is common in practice with an Internet Exchange (IX) as an intermediary,
operated often by a public or impartial organization. Such arrangement,
connecting network providers of a large city for instance, offers benefits to
all participants significant enough to ignore any imbalance.
Although in real life ISP peering is based on complicated business con-
siderations, game theory can help us gain insights into some fundamental
questions. For example, [18] used evolutionary game theory to illustrate
that it is in the long term interest of the ISPs to be connected. In [19],
authors argued that ISPs should cooperate and showed how they can share
the benefit of a connected and optimally operated network fairly based on
the concept Shapley value in cooperative game theory.
3.2 Peer-to-peer networking
In hindsight, the appearance of Napster in 1999 was an epochal event. Since
then, peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing has proliferated and rapidly become a
major end-user application, and a bandwidth hog that poses serious network
management challenges. Such peer-to-peer networking leads to two major
areas of concern.
First, there are networking issues for p2p end-users (clients), namely,
how the network should be formed for a specific instance or, for an individ-
ual client, which other clients it should connect with. Sustenance of a p2p
network, for file sharing for instance, relies on client contribution of process-
ing and bandwidth by uploading data for one another. The key problem
is free-riding behaviour [20], when a client downloads without uploading.
Incentive mechanism needs to be in place to balance clients’ download and
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upload shares. The phenomenal success of Bittorent hinges on the use of
simple bilateral tit-for-tat rule [21], by which a client would choke its upload
to another client who is found not uploading in return. The clients form a
market through which demand and supply match up for exchange of file
data. Different p2p protocols are implementations of different distributed
exchange mechanisms, for which bilateral barter is the simplest.
Second, network providers serving p2p clients are faced with a host of
engineering and economic challenges due to two major reasons. Firstly, p2p
traffic is often locality-unaware overlays, being routed oblivious of the under-
lay physical networks [22]. Being locality-unaware means being cost-unaware
in the choice of routes, resulting in inefficient overuse of expensive transit
bandwidth for instance. Secondly, content distribution by p2p clients shifts
traffic away from content providers who are often charged by traffic volume,
to end-users who are often charged flat rate, which translates to revenue
loss to network providers [23]. In principle, the two-way tussle between net-
work provider and p2p clients may be mitigated with better coordination,
when some sort of locality signalling [24] facilitates the alignment of p2p
traffic overlays with the network underlay. However, The three-way interac-
tion among content providers, end-users and network providers can be very
complicated with competing economic interests.
3.3 Ad hoc wireless networks
In recent years, there has been a huge level of interest in the study of wireless
networks. Besides the more practical use of wireless networks as access
networks (e.g. cellular networks or Wifi networks), the other paradigm is
known as ad hoc networks, a multi-hop wireless network spanning potentially
a large area formed by autonomous nodes. These nodes discover each other,
and figure out how to connect to each other to form a network. Each node
may serve as a relay for other nodes some times. This process can be very
complicated since wireless transmissions within a close vicinity interfere each
each other. Besides such technical challenges, the nodes, as autonomous
decision makers, also worry about whether they should free-ride, or try to
optimize for the social welfare. The shared wireless spectrum becoems an
economy, in which each node evaluates its strategy in the game it plays
with all the other nodes. This combination of technical and economic issues
provide a rich set of scenarios for research studies. But these ad hoc networks
are hardly adopted in practice, and there is no clear business model to
validate the model with. The economic analyses of such ad hoc wireless
networks, in our opinion, become rather meaningless.
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4 Network effects
Network effects have been studied as an economic phenomenon for decades,
especially since deregulation of US telecommunications industry in 1980’s.
Antitrust investigation in the software industry, such as that of Microsoft
before Internet times, put network effects into public limelight. Like every
popularized concept, the term has been overused and misused, to the extent
that even plain old economy-of-scale that economizes unit cost of production
is sometimes mistaken as a network effect which scales value-to-customer as
the consumer base increases. Liebowitz further emphasizes that the term
network externalities should be reserved to mean network effects which ben-
efits are not captured by any player or market and remain “external [25]. For
instance, directory service of a centralized telephone network would help user
discover more useful numbers and connect more. The network effect, not
realized otherwise, is said to be internalized by the directory service provider
in this case, and shared with all users. Without the directory service, the
network effect would have remained an externality. The distinction between
internalized network effects and non-internalized network externality is in-
deed important as it carries policy implications. Network externalities are
often indication of threat or opportunities beyond the stakeholders’ con-
trol, such as when directory service is poorly provisioned and users are not
connecting as much as they would be otherwise, it may be a case of “mar-
ket failure” that warrants intervention, for instance, when public funding is
sought for provisioning a directory service.
Congestion, discussed in a previous section, which may cause traffic
volatility, even instability, is a network effect of the negative kind. An
important strategy of congestion control is to prevent the spread of con-
gestion, by dropping packets at the congested link to signal link users to
back off. This containment strategy, restricting the negative effects to those
responsible, has an economic interpretation. The network effect is said to
be internalized. Otherwise, when congestion spreads, the network effect
becomes network externality, causing impact to innocent flows elsewhere.
While negative network effects such as congestion poses threat to the
Internet, positive network effects are prime drivers of its rapid growth. There
are two basic principles, both economical. First, network components are
used in combination; for instance, any path between two network users
is a tandem of links. Addition of a component, such as a link, increases
the number of combinations available, by creating new alternative paths.
Second, the value of the Internet to any user increases with addition of every
new user, which means a larger community to connect with, and potentially
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more content being shared. In either case, the side benefits to others are
welcome network externalities. Such externalities in aggregate are powerful
incentive to all sorts of businesses and innovations, which in turn generate
more Internet traffic, and congestion. In broad term, the tussle between
positive and negative network effects is a fundamental limit to Internet’s
growth.
4.1 How much network effect
It is noteworthy that different ways to quantify network effect have been a
topic of debate. The most well-known is Metcalf ’s Law, which has become
a folklore. The law says that the value of a communications network is pro-
portional to the square of the number of users connected to it. Basically, this
is characterizing the positive network effect of a communications network as
the maximum number of other users a user can connect to.
Several years after the bust of the dotcom euphoria, Andrew Odlyzko
et al wrote an article to refute Metcalf’s law [26]. By blaming the financial
down-turn on Metcalf’s law, this paper drew quite a bit of attention. The
basic idea is that not all other users generate the same amount of positive
network effect. In the end, it is more appropriate to give log(n) credit to the
network effect experienced by each user, thus the total network effect would
be nlog(n). They reached the log(n) amount in several ways. You can say
each user is only likely to know log(n) other users; or you can even rank the
values of other users by Zipf’s law to arrive at the log(n) conclusion. Their
article is quite an interesting read.
4.2 Economic theory of network effects
It was Katz and Shapiro’s timely paper [27] in 1985, prompted by the then
seachange in telecommunications industry and consumerization of comput-
ing, that initiated the economic theory of network effects. They studied the
nature of competition in many technology settings: they tried to explain
when multiple technical solutions compete, why sometimes the best technol-
ogy may not win (for example Beta versus VHS, and the operating systems
battles); and when do competitors agree to standardize their technologies
[27]. They succeeded in explaining many such contemporary phenomena in
terms of network effect. In particular, they show that multiple equilibria
are possible, among which joint adoption of product standard is one. The
extent of network effect, much of which predicated on consumers expecta-
tion, is a key determinant. As such, it explained, perhaps even predicted,
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Figure 1: Market equilibria with network effects
fierce competition and innovation in influencing consumers expectation and
early behaviour, exemplified by generous support for software developers,
giveaway trial versions, the freemium approach, etc.
One of the most familiar result concerns the viability of a service (or
product) in view of network effect. Suppose there is a unit cost of c in
delivering the service to each user. The total cost for n users is represented
as a straight line. Due to network effect, the value of the service (product)
is represented as a sigmoidal curve whose value is initially below the cost
line, but quickly rises above the cost line. Eventually, as n approaches total
market size, it naturally tapers off. See Fig. 1 for an illustration. In a
market with free competition, revenue (user value) equals cost. At least
three equilibria exists: (a) the zero user solution; (b) the unstable solution
when the total network effect first covers all the costs for n users; and (c)
when users and network effect both increase until the total network effect
sustains a much larger user base. They are the three places the value curve
crosses the cost line. The equilibrium (b) is not stable because any change
in the user number will cause the system to converge to one of the other two
equilibria. There is a description of this in [28]; the same observation comes
up in many other studies involving network effect.
Later, Katz and Shaprio also studied models on systems competition,
that is, when a service (or system) is offered by two or more products, such as
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hardware and software, how network effect affect products across products.
For example, a software solution for a particular hardware platform can
benefit from the increasing user base of that hardward platform, and vice
versa [29].
4.3 Net neutrality
Perhaps the most controversial topic in Internet economics is the still on-
going debate surrounding net neutrality. From a business model point of
view, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are keen in competing for business
opportunities that can benefit from the network effect, such as content dis-
tribution, on-line social networks or games - by, if not directly entering these
businesses, by extracting profits from these services. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) of the USA, however, wants to keep the Internet
as open as possible as a platform for innovation and free competition. To
ensure this, FCC wants the ISPs to stay completely neutral in offering their
service to all users.
It is not surprising to see economists at opposite ends when arguing about
government policies. This is less common with (networking) engineers who
usually converge to the same models and same conclusions. But network
effect (although it has the word network in it) is more about economics
than networks. Many economists argue that excessive regulation, albeit in
the good name of net neutrality, can induce market inefficiencies [30] while
others assert that when net neutrality is compromised, with excessive service
differentiation and price discrimination profitable to some but constricting
to the community’s growth, network effect will be gravely undermined to
the detriment of all eventually.
The concept of a multi-sided market, which captures the notion of plat-
form in digital economy, has provided useful elaboration of network effects
in this connection. The Internet is an exemplary multi-sided market [31],
with the Internet a platform around which different types of users gather,
including network providers, content/application providers, and end-users.
Besides the two basic kinds of network effects, a multi-sided market exhibit
also cross-side network effects. Consider content/application providers and
end-users. The benefit to a content/application provider, in business terms,
increases with the number of end-users. Also, the benefit to an end-user,
in access to content and services, also increases with the number of con-
tent/application providers. Economides formulated a simple two-sided mar-
ket model of the Internet with explicit cross-side network effects in both
directions, as illustrated in Fig. 2, then went on to show that net neutrality
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Figure 2: Internet as a two-sided platform
can ensure the right mix of such network effects so that social benefit is
maximized [32].
5 Concluding remarks
5.1 Some topics not included
There are many other topics we could have included, but for a variety of
reasons were left out. The most likely reason is due to the limitations of
our background. We both had a primarily engineering training, with some
reading in economic topics. We hoped to point out more useful economic
concepts and re-inventing-of-the-wheels related to them, than we managed
to do.
There are certain topics, while quite interesting to us, seem more rele-
vant to specific businesses and their operations than an economic issue, for
example various e-commerce topics, or Ad auctions. They certainly can be
included as part of a network economics course, and will likely receive a lot
of interest.
Other than net neutrality, we have not discussed much on government
policies. There are certainly a lot of material in this area, including the
management of frequency spectrum, regulation of content distribution, and
others. Some of these issues become as much related to national security as
economics.
Finally, economists have also studied many interesting problems arisen
due to various kinds of information technologies, not necessarily networks.
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For example, the issue of how to price informational goods, and how it is
different from physical goods? In the section on network effects, we touch
upon some of these more economic (rather than network) issues. Some of
these topics are arguably quite related to the Internet and can be included
in a course on network economics as well.
5.2 Observations
The engineering and management of the Internet and its value-added ser-
vices inevitably involve economic considerations. The abstraction, general-
ization and analysis of these considerations crystalize into network economics
(or more specifically, Internet economics). Some of the topics are induced
by the Internet, and are unique to the networks; whereas some others are
special applications of generic economic principles.
The study of network economics helps us to understand the demand for
network connectivity, bandwidths and services, so that we can make better
design of the Internet. For example, Kelly used utility functions to model
users’ demand for network bandwidth; Metcalf, Odlyzko and Economides
used network effects to help characterize the consumer economy-of-scale on
network services.
The interesting problems of network economics - we hope we picked some
to discuss in this paper - are usually inspired by the real tussles between
economic stakeholders, even if the problems have gone through some ab-
straction. The moral is, we need to talk to real-life service operators, and
study real business models and popular phenomena, to understand what
and where the interesting problems are.
As networks, applications and network services continue to expand, so
will the study of network economics. We think network economics makes
an interesting inter-disciplinary course for student majoring in computer
network, Internet technologies and related areas. Such a course can be
offered at either graduate level, or undergraduate level. The book and course
by Easley and Kleinberg [33] is a good example for an undergraduate level
course of this type6.
We believe there is value for a journal devoted to network economics.
This will help keep research papers in this topic area easier to find, and
build a small research commitee to foster collaboration. The NetEcon and
WINE workshops, which have been run for several years, are already quite
6This course is not only focused on network economics, but also on network science
applied to some other new Internet services and phenomena.
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helpful. To be successful, however, it must be truly inter-disciplinary, draw-
ing researchers from both economics as well as networking/engineering.
5.3 Promising future directions
Moving forward, we see that Internet will connect not only our computers,
but also our phones, TVs and many other devices (e.g sensors). The dispute
(and cooperation) between network delivery providers, content providers
and other value-added service providers will continue; so the debate on net
neutrality has only just begun. We expect to see interesting developments
here.
Various efforts (in US, Europe as well as in Asian countries) are devoted
to future Internet architectures. The viability of these new designs must
make economic sense. For this reason, we anticipate interesting network eco-
nomic studies in relation to the future Internet efforts. Two thoughts came
up in our brainstorming. First, when we worked on service differentiation
(QoS) more than 10 years ago, the dotcom bubble led to over-provisioning,
which rendered QoS unnecessary. But network QoS may become necessary
again, due to the increase in traffic caused by new services (e.g. high-
definition video) and the access network turning mostly wireless which has
finite bandwidth to share. Second, as the whole world is becoming more en-
ergy and environment conscious nowadays, this may become an important
consideration, which is somewhat economic.
Finally, as we write, it seems to us that this whole research area is
waiting for a more overarching theory to emerge. Perhaps a Nobel prize will
be awarded for network economics some day?
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